when contracting.3 This information, however, is important since it will typically affect the ultimate outcome.
In this project we distinguish between the cases where the agent cares and those where he does not care "directly" about the principal's type or information. The former case is that of common values. In the latter case, where we say that values are private, the agent's expected payoff is a function only of the principal's behavior, not of her information. Formally speaking, privateness means that, holding the principal's behavior fixed, her information parameter is an argument neither of the agent's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function nor of the probabilities he assigns to the variables entering his utility function. 4 Of course, even in this case, the agent typically cares indirectly about the principal's information because the outcome of the third stage (i.e., the determination of an action and transfer) may depend on the principal's message, which in turn is influenced by her information.
In this paper we shall deal exclusively with private values. This hypothesis seems a good approximation for the public good, procurement, and regulation examples mentioned above. For instance, the weapons contractor cares only about its profit and not per se about the defense value of the missiles it creates. The reader may wish to keep these three examples in mind as paradigms of the sort of situation we are trying to model. By contrast, the common-values case, where the agent's payoff depends directly on the principal's type, is illustrated by our monopoly and franchising examples. Specifically, the consumer of a particular good is ordinarily concerned directly about the quality of that good. We take up this case in Maskin-Tirole (1988) .
Section 3 demonstrates that the equilibrium contract in our model generally differs considerably from that of the standard principal-agent framework (where only the agent has private information). Indeed, the principal profits from the agent's incomplete information about her type. To see why this is so, note that when the principal proposes a contract, she does so subject to two kinds of constraints. There is the requirement that the contract should not leave the agent worse off than with no contract, i.e., the individual rationality (IR) constraint. There are also constraints ensuring that, when the contract is carried out, the agent behaves in the appropriate way given his private information. These are the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. Now, when the agent knows the value of 3In this respect, our framework is a synthesis of the screening and signaling models. In this paper, however, we concentrate on the case of "private values," whereas the signaling literature to date has concentrated primarily on common values (see the next several paragraphs for the distinction). 4To see that, in general, we have to rule out the parameter's affecting the agent's probabilities (as well as entering his utility function), think of a model of a moral hazard in which output depends stochastically on the agent's (unobservable) effort and where the principal has private information about this stochastic relationship. Conventionally, the agent's utility function does not depend on the principal's information, but rather on his effort and monetary reward. Nonetheless, the principal's information does directly affect the agent's probabilistic beliefs about output and, hence, his monetary transfer. Thus the agent's expected payoff is, after all, a function of the principal's type. We conclude that such a model is an instance of common values. the principal's information parameter (the case of "full information"), the IR and IC constraints must hold individually for each type of principal. With incomplete information, however, they need hold only in expectation over the principal's types. Thus, a given type of principal can raise her utility above the full-information level (where all the constraints must be satisfied) by violating some constraints, as long as these violations are offset by the other types. In fact, we can think of different types of principal as trading "slack" with one another: one type, say, accepts some slack on the IR constraint in exchange for being allowed to violate an IC constraint, whereas another type does just the opposite. As we show in Section 3A, generically (in the space of utility functions) there exists a contract in which all types of principal do strictly better than in the case of full information (Proposition 1).
This result depends crucially on the private-values assumption. Consider, by contrast, a Spencian labor market (c.f., Spence (1974) ) in which the "principal" is an employee of either high or low productivity. In this case the agent's (employer's) payoff certainly depends directly on the principal's type. It is clear, moreover, that the high productivity employee is likely to be hurt by the employer's incomplete information: either she will find herself "pooled" with her low productivity counterpart (in which case her wage will fall short of her marginal product) or else she will have to undertake costly signaling activity (e.g., education) to distinguish herself.5 Thus in a common-values model, unlike one with private values, there is a conflict among the different types of principal.
We can say much more about the equilibrium of our three-stage game than merely that the different types of principal do better than under full information. Indeed, to continue the trading analogy introduced above, consider the fictitious pure-exchange economy in which the traders are the different types of principal and the goods exchanged are the slack variables. A trader's initial endowment consists of the values of these slack variables under full information (i.e., zero). For reasons exactly paralleling the usual competitive analysis, a Walrasian equilibrium always exists for this economy (Proposition 2). Strikingly, moreover, the Walrasian allocations are precisely the perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes of our three-stage game (Propositions 6 and 9).
From this Walrasian characterization, we can readily establish the generic local uniqueness (Proposition 10) and Pareto optimality (Pareto optimality is, of course, constrained by the fact that the agent also has private information) of equilibrium. Indeed, a strong concept of Pareto optimality offers an alternative characterization of equilibrium. For a contract to be feasible it must satisfy the IR and IC constraints in expectation. The "expectation," of course, depends on the agent's beliefs about the principal. A feasible contract is strongly Pareto optimal (from the point of view of the different types of principal) for given 5Such an outcome is impossible with private values. A given type of principal can always simply propose the contract that would obtain if the agent knew her type (the "full information" contract), and the agent will accept regardless of his beliefs. In the labor-market example, by contrast, the employer would reject the full-information contract proposal of the high-productivity employee if he thought there was a chance the employee had low productivity.
beliefs if there exists no other feasible contract, even for different beliefs, that Pareto dominates it. A Walrasian allocation is strongly Pareto optimal (Proposition 3, our analog of the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics). Moreover, every strong Pareto optimum is Wairasian (Proposition 4, the Second Welfare Theorem). Hence, given the above-mentioned equivalence between Walrasian equilibria and the PBE's of our game, the same equivalence holds between the strong Pareto optima and the PBE's (Proposition 7).6
To reap the gain from the agent's incomplete information, when values are private, the principal must refrain from revealing her type at the contract proposal stage (otherwise, the IR and IC constraints must hold for that type, rather than just in expectation). To accomplish this concealment, the various types of principal have to "pool," i.e., propose the same contract in equilibrium.7
After our main analysis, we consider in Section 4 the special, but often-studied case where the principal and agent have quasi-linear objective functions (utilities that are additively separable and linear in transfers). In this nongeneric case, the Walrasian equilibrium of the fictitious economy involves no trade and the (unique) equilibrium outcome of our contract proposal game coincides with that of the standard principal-agent model. In other words, with quasi-linear preferences, the principal neither gains nor loses if her information is revealed to the agent before contracting. Section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL
We now describe the model. In the conclusion, we argue that several of our simplifying assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the results.
A. Objective Functions and Information
There are two parties, a principal and an agent. The principal has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function V(y, t, a), where y is an observable (and verifiable8) action, t is a monetary transfer (which can assume negative as well as positive values) from the principal to the agent, and a is a parameter representing the principal's private information or "type." We shall suppose that y, t, and a 6 This result together with Proposition 10 suggests how powerful the concept of strong Pareto optimality is: there is a continuum of ordinary Pareto optima but, generically, only finitely many strong Pareto optima corresponding to the prior beliefs. 7 The mere observation that there exists a pooling equilibrium of the contract proposal game is, by itself, a triviality and holds irrespective of whether values are private or common. Indeed, it is just a reflection of the "Inscrutability Principle" of Myerson (1983), which notes that any possible equilibrium outcome arises from some pooling equilibrium if the set of available contracts is sufficiently large. The real substance of our pooling result is that such a separating equilibrium is not possible when values are private and the principal also has private information. Generically, in this latter case, all equilibria entail some pooling. In particular, no subset of types of principal is completely separated. (If some subset were completely separated, its members would not trade at all with the complementary subset in Walrasian equilibrium, which is generically impossible.) 8By " verifiable" we mean that the action is observable by a third party; thus, it can be specified by an enforceable contract. are real numbers. In the case where the principal is a buyer of some good and the agent is a seller, one can think of y as the quantity of good delivered to the principal. Nothing turns, however, on whether the action is, in fact, taken by the agent or the principal, since it is observed by both and can be specified by a contract. The function V increases with y and decreases with t. It is continuously differentiable and concave in the pair (y, t) and strictly concave in y.
The agent has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U(y, t, 0), where the information parameter 0 (a scalar) is the agent's type. That U does not depend on a embodies the assumption of private values and is an important assumption. (In contrast, our results would be unaffected if V depended on 0. See the conclusion.) U decreases with y and increases with t; it is continuously differentiable and concave in (y, t) and strictly concave in y. We will also assume that it decreases with 0: if 01 < 02, then U(y, t, 01) > U(y, t, 02) for all (y, t). We shall suppose that in the absence of a contract with the principal, a "null" contract takes effect in which the agent obtains reservation utility iu9 Throughout the paper, superscripts (indexed by i) and feminine pronouns refer to the principal, whereas subscripts (indexed by j) and masculine pronouns apply to the agent.
To guarantee the existence of equilibrium, we assume that the feasible actions and transfers lie in compact and convex sets. Let ,u denote a probability measure on these sets. If, for example, I is discrete, ,u{ y, t }) represents the probability of action y and transfer t. We will allow contracts to specify a measure , as an outcome. We thus permit random outcomes.
We assume that the parameters a and 0 are drawn from known and statistically independent distributions. Parameter a is known only to the principal, and O only to the agent. We suppose that each parameter can assume only finitely many values: a = al,..., a n with positive probabilities 7i, ..., 9"n such that Ei= 7Ti = 1, and 0 = 01 and 02 with positive probabilities Pi and P2 (Pl +P2 = 1). (1 = 1,2).
9Thus, we can assume that the principal and agent always sign a contract, since the absence of a contract is just a special case of having one. Formally, we must assume that the null (y, t) pair (ordinarily y = t = 0) belongs to the feasible set.
Let t be the smallest transfer from the principal to the agent (it may well be negative). We will assume that given this transfer the agent is necessarily worse off than without a contract, regardless of his type or the action y: ASSUMPTION 1: Uj(y, t, Oj) < u for all y and j = 1, 2.
We will suppose also that, regardless of the values of 0 and a, there exists a feasible action and transfer that both parties prefer to the null contract, i.e., to the absence of a contract.
B. The Principal-Agent Game
Let us describe our three-stage game in detail. In the first stage the principal proposes a contract or mechanism in the feasible set M (we will use the words "contract" or "mechanism" interchangeably). A mechanism m in M specifies (i) a set of possible messages that each party can choose and (ii) for each pair of messages sP and Sa chosen simultaneously by the principal and agent, respectively, a corresponding measure ji on the set of deterministic allocations (y, t).10 Thus, a mechanism is a game form that selects a (random) outcome conditional on a pair of (payoff-irrelevant) messages.11 Observe that, because the principal, as well as the agent, can make announcements, she may be able to reveal information at the third stage (see below) as well as at the contract proposal stage.
For the moment we let M denote the set of finite mechanisms (mechanisms where the number of available messages for each party is finite) for simplicity. For technical reasons, we will slightly expand the set of allowable mechanisms in Section 3D.12
Notice that the set M includes the set of direct revelation mechanisms, in which both parties simultaneously announce their types (not necessarily truthfully). Hence, in a direct revelation mechanism (DRM), (sP, sa) = (a, 0), where a hat denotes an announced value. We will make considerable use of these DRM's by repeatedly invoking the revelation principle for Bayesian games (see DasguptaHammond-Maskin (1979) or Myerson (1979) ). In the present context, this principle asserts that, for any mechanism and for given beliefs at the time that mechanism is about to be played (i.e., after it has already been accepted), any equilibrium of the mechanism corresponds to an equilibrium of some DRM in which announcements are truthful.
Observe that if a assumed only one value (i.e., there were no uncertainty about the principal), the revelation principle would imply that the principal could restrict attention to mechanisms where she sends no message in the third stage. Because the conventional assumption in the literature is that the principal has no private information, we shall call a mechanism standard if it consists simply of the agent's announcing his type (so that principal announces nothing).
In the second stage, the agent accepts or refuses the contract offered by the principal. He obtains his reservation utility if he refuses.'3 If he accepts, the two parties play the proposed mechanism in the third stage (for instance, they announce their types if the mechanism is direct), and the allocation corresponding to their third period moves is implemented.
The principal's strategy in the three-stage game consists of a choice of mechanism and a choice of message (sP) for each mechanism in M. The agent's strategy consists of (i) the decision to accept or reject the mechanism and (ii) a choice of announcement (sa) in the mechanism. Both the agent's decisions are contingent on the mechanism proposed.
We are interested in the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the overall game.14 In our framework, such an equilibrium is a vector of strategies-one for each type of player (in our model, there are n + 2 types)-and a vector of beliefs about the other player's type15 at each information set in the game tree such that (i) the strategies are optimal (i.e., at all points in the tree each type is maximizing expected utility given beliefs and the other types' strategies); (ii) beliefs are derived from Bayes' rule given observed behavior and the equilibrium strategies; and (iii) the principal's beliefs about the agent at the end of the first stage remain the prior beliefs (regardless of her proposal) and the agent's beliefs about the principal are the same at the end of the second stage as at the end of the first. 16 Thus, in particular, we assume that the agent updates his beliefs about the principal's type using Bayes' rule, after observing the contract she proposes. Similarly, we suppose that the principal revises her beliefs appropriately after observing that the agent has accepted the contract. In the continuation game of the third stage, there may, of course, be multiple equilibria. We suppose that the 13 In this respect, our model differs from that of the multiperiod bargaining literature (e.g., Admati-Perry (1986), Fudenberg-Tirole (1983), and Sobel-Takahashi (1983), wherein it is typically assumed that the seller (principal) cannot prevent herself from making another offer if the buyer turns her down initially. Note also that there is no conflict between our "pooling" result and the separating equilibria of the noncooperative bargaining literature. A pooling equilibrium does not imply that the different types of principal end up with the same allocation; we can think of a contract as a schedule of allocations-one for each type. The different types self-select in the third stage.
14 Note that because the set of finite mechanisms is itself infinite, so is the strategy space for the principal. Thus standard equilibrium existence lemmas do not apply. Because the second stage continuation equilibria are sequential (see footnote 16), however, standard results ensure that they exist and that their corresponding payoffs are upper hemicontinuous with respect to beliefs.
15 The principal's beliefs are the probabilities that she assigns to 6; the agent's beliefs are the probabilities that he assigns to a.
16 Actually, with requirement (iii) (which, in effect, requires that a player's beliefs about the other's type are not affected by his own actions), our definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium is somewhat stronger than the usual definition. Indeed, as Fudenberg-Tirole (1989) show, conditions (i)-(iii) would imply that the equilibrium is sequential if the principal's strategy space were finite. players can coordinate over these equilibria by means of some public randomizing device17 such as a coin flip. If the coin turns up heads, they play one equilibrium; if tails, they play another. Thus, in the third stage, we permit (publicly) correlated equilibria.
We denote by = {fr Ti}. ' the agent's prior beliefs about the principal's type and, by VT = { 77 }7 his beliefs after the principal has proposed a contract. We shall call these latter probabilities his posterior beliefs. To study the set of equilibrium outcomes, we will use the revelation principle. For given posterior beliefs Ir= { r }7=" (such that Eil7T = 1), any outcome of the continuation game between the principal and the agent is also the outcome of a direct revelation game in which, in equilibrium, both parties announce their information parameters truthfully and simultaneously. In Sections 3 and 4, we will first construct the strategies along the equilibrium path, and then consider off-the-equilibrium-path proposals m for given posterior beliefs sz. Rather than study the equilibrium of the game described by m, we will instead work with the equivalent direct mechanism ,u, where IL is the (random) outcome implemented if the principal announces type i and the agent announces type j.
C. The Case of Full Information
For reference, we first examine equilibrium when the principal's information is common knowledge, i.e., the agent knows the value of a before contracting. We call this the full information case (the principal, of course, does not know the agent's type, but, since this feature is maintained throughout the paper, the terminology should not create confusion). This is merely the standard screening set-up (see footnote 2).
Let us assume that a = a'. From the revelation principle, we know that the equilibrium allocation can be attained by a standard DRM ,t'. where, in equilibrium, the agent reveals his type truthfully. The outcome ,ji (j = 1,2) that the contract specifies when the agent announces type j must satisfy two types of constraints. First, the agent must be willing to accept the contract. That is, it must satisfy the individual rationality (IR) constraints: for j = 1,2, U)(,)> u1 . Second, the type j agent must tell the truth. This gives rise to the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints: for all j, k: Uj(O, ) > Uj(kk).
Actually, in an optimal contract (one maximizing the principal's utility), only two of these four constraints are binding. Because the agent's utility decreases with his type, only the IR constraint for an agent of type 2 is required; the other holds automatically. Moreover, this monotonicity of utility implies (see Lemma 1 below) that only the type 1 IC constraint (U1(,4) > U(,u')) can be binding. Thus, when her information is common knowledge, a prncipal of type i proposes a 17 The technical reason for allowing public randomization is to ensure that the equilibrium payoff set of the continuation game is convex. Note that this randomization is in addition to that already built into the mechanism (see footnote 10). It is clear that, regardless of the agent's information about the principal, v` provides a lower bound for the type i principal's payoff in our three-stage game. To see this, suppose that she proposed the mechanism iii'.. Then irrespective of his beliefs, the agent would accept the proposal because, by definition of the mechanism, he could guarantee himself a payoff of at least iu by so doing. Moreover, again by definition, he will announce the truth. Thus, by proposing the mechanism 'ii, the principal ensures herself the payoff vi.
PERFECT BAYESIAN AND WALRASIAN EQUILIBRIA
Our goal is a complete characterization of the equilibria of the principal-agent game, but we begin with a simpler problem: studying the contract that would be proposed by a third party who maximized an arbitrary weighted sum of the payoffs of the different types of principal (Section 3A). We first show that, generically, this third party could implement a contract that Pareto dominates the full-information allocation. It accomplishes this by "pooling" the agent's IR and IC constraints over the different types of principal, i.e., by having the constraints hold only in expectation rather than for each single type. This examination leads naturally to a study of the Walrasian equilibria and Pareto optima of the fictitious pure-exchange economy where the traders are the different types of principal and "exchange" the slack variables corresponding to the agent's IR and IC constraints (Section 3B). The relevance of this competitive analysis is demonstrated when we establish that equilibria in the principal-agent game exist (Section 3C) and correspond exactly to the Walrasian allocations of the fictitious economy. Equilibria therefore inherit the Pareto optimality and local uniqueness properties of Walrasian allocations (Section 3D).
A. Unconstrained Pareto Optima
As the starting point of the analysis, let us consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that, rather than the principal, a third party proposes the contract between the principal and the agent. Assume that it acts to maximize a weighted average of the payoffs of the different types of principal, where the weights are nonnegative but arbitrary and fixed beforehand. Suppose, furthermore, that after the contract is proposed and accepted, the principal's type is made publicly known. The device of a third party is meant to rationalize the objective function; if the principal were proposing the contract, she would certainly not do so to maximize an arbitrary weighted average. The fact that the weights are fixed beforehand and do not depend on knowledge the third party has avoids the complicating possibility that the proposal itself may reveal information. Note also that we do not take account of any IR constraints on the part of the principal.18 Finally, the assumption that the principal's type becomes public knowledge ex post eliminates the issue of incentive compatibility for the principal at the third stage. If a were not public knowledge, then any announcement the principal made at the third stage would reflect her type; her announcement would have to satisfy the IC constraints. Under our hypothesis, by contrast, the contract can make the outcome directly contingent on the principal's type, without having the principal make announcements.
Given these assumptions, the third party solves the program:
Max E wi( Ep1vi( Yi' )) such that Suppose that the type i principal is allowed to "buy" negative slack (i.e., to sell slack) in the IR1 and IC1 constraints at prices p and y, respectively, subject to the "budget" constraint that the value of the negative slack purchased be nonpositive. She then solves: Conditions (2) and (3) are "market clearing" requirements, which ensure that the "average" amount of negative slack demanded for each constraint equal the average supply, zero. Condition (4) simply requires that each trader's choice of slack maximize her (indirect) utility given her budget constraint. We next observe that a Walrasian equilibrium exists in our model for reasons analogous to those in the classical competitive model. PROPOSITION 2: There exists a Walrasian equilibrium of the fictitious economy relative to any beliefs qr.
The proof (which can be found in Maskin-Tirole (1986)) is standard from general equilibrium theory. It suffices to check that the utility functions V/'(r', ci) satisfy the requisite continuity and concavity properties and then to apply the usual Debreu (1959) techniques.
Just as an ordinary Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto efficient, so an equilibrium of our fictitious economy has attractive efficiency properties.
PROPOSITION 3: A Walrasian equilibrium of thefictitious competitive economy is strongly unconstrained Pareto optimal (SUPO).21
Notice that a Walrasian allocation iK is SUPO even when the corresponding beliefs s' are degenerate, i.e., s' = 1 for some i. Now, with such beliefs, the type i principal's utility from this allocation is just the full information level, vi. Therefore, because generically the full information allocation ii: is not SUPO, we conclude that (generically) at least one other type of principal does strictly better with ,u: than with ,-i. Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that there is a SUPO allocation for any beliefs 7'. This result relies importantly on the private-values assumption. By contrast, consider the (common-values) labor market example of the introduction. In that model, it is readily checked that there exist "pessimistic" beliefs on the part of the agent (beliefs that assign a comparatively high probability to the "bad" type of principal) relative to which any allocation is Pareto dominated by some allocation for more optimistic beliefs. Roughly speaking, this is because, when values are common, the agent suffers from the principal's type being bad. Thus when the probability of the bad type is high, the agent must be paid correspondingly high compensation (i.e., the principal's wages are low), implying that the principal's types have low payoffs. Note that with private values, there is no such thing as pessimistic or optimistic beliefs since the agent does not care about the principal's type. 21 Above we described the SUPO locus as the outer envelope of the UPO locus as beliefs vary. Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that for any beliefs there is a corresponding point on that envelope. foralli.
I Let p and -y denote the Lagrange multipliers of (6) and (7). Since S = -T solves the above program and, for all i, I'T is strictly between 0 and 1, the first-order condition obtained by differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to g' is:
()prAi + yC^i = O.
(9) r y8=0
The first-order conditions with respect to r' and ci imply (10) r' c ' =p/y for all i. In view of (9) and (10) and because V/(r', ci) is concave in (ri, ci), we infer that (ri, c^i) E Di(p, -y). We conclude that {(p, ry),{(r^, c^)}7_} is a Walrasian equilibrium relative to beliefs s'.
Q.E.D. REMARX: In our definition of W*, we did not require that the principal's utilities exceed the full information levels. Nonetheless, the corollary to Proposition 4 demonstrates that this property holds for all points in W* corresponding to strictly positive beliefs. The corollary also vindicates our omission of the principal's IC constraints in the definition of W*. It can be shown, however, that both Proposition 4 and its corollary are false when beliefs fail to be strictly positive (see Maskin-Tirole (1986) ).
Given that a competitive economy is sufficiently smooth, it generically has only finitely many equilibria. For exactly the same reasons, we can draw such a conclusion in our model. 
C. Equilibrium in the Principal-Agent Game
We now use our results for the competitive economy to study perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the principal-agent game. We first demonstrate that one can construct such an equilibrium from a Walrasian allocation. To demonstrate that this behavior forms an equilibrium path, we work backwards from the end. We first show that truthful revelation is optimal for both parties in the third stage; next, that it is in the agent's interest to accept the mechanism 2. in the second stage; and, finally, that for any alternative contract proposal in the first stage, there exist posterior beliefs and a corresponding continuation equilibrium in which no type of principal is better off than on the equilibrium path.
Because fi: is a Walrasian allocation relative to beliefs vr it satisfies the agent's IC constraints by definition. Hence, if the principal announces the truth in the third stage, the agent will find it worthwhile to do so too if his beliefs are v7. From the corollary to Proposition 4, ,ii also satisfies the principal's IC constraints when her beliefs about the agent's type are (Pl, P2). Hence, truth-telling forms a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the third stage, assuming that the parties have maintained their prior beliefs.
Because the agent obtains at least the utility iu in the third stage, it is optimal for him, given his prior beliefs, to accept the proposal fi: in the second stage regardless of his type. Hence, the principal will not update her prior beliefs.
It remains to choose off-the-path strategies and beliefs at the first stage that deter the principal from proposing a contract other than ,u:. Suppose that the principal proposes some other, finite mechanism m. Because this proposal is never made in equilibrium, beliefs X are not determined by Bayes' rule. Instead, they can be arbitrary. For each possible vector of beliefs, there is at least one corresponding continuation equilibrium (see Kreps-Wilson (1982) To summarize the construction of the proof, each type of principal proposes the Walrasian allocation AI as a direct revelation mechanism. In equilibrium, the agent accepts the proposal, and, in the the third stage, the two parties announce their types truthfully. Should the principal propose some other mechanism, the agent's beliefs and the continuation equilibrium are chosen so that all types of principal are no better off than with ii:. That this is possible is particularly clear when n = 2. Suppose that the principal proposes some out-of-equilibrium mechanism m. If the agent attaches probability 1 to a = al, then the type 1 principal can derive no more utility than U0, which is clearly less than that which she derives from #.. Similarly, the type 2 principal obtains less utility from m if the agent believes a = a2 than from jr.. 
D. Uniqueness
We proved in subsection 3C that there exists an equilibrium of the three-stage principal-agent game. This equilibrium corresponds to a Walrasian allocation of the fictitious competitive economy. We now investigate uniqueness.
Sequential games of incomplete information are often plagued by a plethora of equilibria. One may wonder whether such is the case here. Can any strong UPO allocation be an equilibrium outcome of the three-stage game? Do there exist any suboptimal equilibria? As we shall see, the answer to both questions is "no." Indeed, we demonstrate that only Walrasian allocations relative to the prior beliefs S can arise as equilibria of the principal-agent game. Since such allocations are, generically, locally unique, the same is, therefore, true of the game's equilibrium outcomes.
To establish our uniqueness result, we expand the class of permissible mechanisms somewhat. In particular, we now include mechanisms in which a third party, in addition to the principal and agent, chooses from a set of messages. Moreover, rather than just dealing with finite mechanisms, we let the permissible set M* include all mechanisms m such that, if the principal's beliefs about the agent at the time the mechanism is to be played are given by the prior beliefs Besides enlarging the class of available mechanisms, we also strengthen our assumptions about the agent's utility function. Specifically, we suppose that it satisfies a conventional "sorting" assumption. That equilibrium allocations must be Pareto optimal relies on the ability of the principal to break an inefficient equilibrium by proposing an alternative mechanism that, whatever the agent's beliefs turn out to be, makes (at least) one of her types better off. This "equilibrium breaking" can be accomplished by the following simple mechanism m*. First, the principal and agent announce probability vectors g and gTa (corresponding to the agent's beliefs about the principal's type when m* is proposed). If s7 * S7a the null contract is imposed. If s7 = 7a = ST, the principal and agent play the Walrasian direct-revelation game corresponding to 7T. I.e., they announce their types simultaneously, and the outcome is the Walrasian allocation for the announced types relative to s7 (the game must be somewhat modified if there are multiple Walrasian equilibria). Notice that it is an equilibrium of this game for the two players to announce the agent's true beliefs and then announce their true types. This equilibrium, therefore, is Walrasian relative to the agent's true beliefs, and so does the trick of equilibrium breaking.
The weakness of m* is that, although the above "truthful" equilibrium may be particularly salient, there are other, "perverse" equilibria of m* in which the players (a) announce different beliefs, or (b) announce the same but false beliefs, or (c) announce their types falsely. The proof of Proposition 7 (see Appendix) constructs a more elaborate mechanism, based on m*, in which these perverse equilibria are eliminated and only the Walrasian outcome remains.
The Pareto optimality of equilibrium depends importantly on private values. As we noted following Proposition 3, SUPO allocations do not even exist relative to all beliefs in common-values models such as the Spencian labor market. Moreover, even for beliefs relative to which a SUPO allocation does exist, there can be many inefficient equilibria even if the principal uses the sort of mechanisms invoked in the proof of Proposition 7. This is because to break an inefficient equilibrium, as we have noted, the principal needs to propose a mechanism that, regardless of the agent's beliefs, is better for one of her types.
But with common values and "pessimistic" beliefs by the agent (beliefs that attach high probability to the bad type(s) of principal), all the principal's types may actually be worse off than in the inefficient equilibrium. Thus the equilibrium cannot be broken.
One can interpret Proposition 7 as an illustration of the idea that if, relative to beliefs, there are gains from trade, the principal ought to be able to exploit them. The common-values model is not a counterexample to this pnrnciple because there, if the principal tries to overcome the inefficiency, the agent's beliefs may change in such a way that there are no gains from trade. Q.E.D.
We noted above that any equilibrium allocation can be thought of as arising from a pooling equilibrium, in which all types of principal propose the same mechanism. Proposition 8 demonstrates that, in general, some pooling is essential in equilibrium. A Walrasian allocation generically strictly Pareto dominates the full-information payoff vector. Thus the fact that the equilibrium allocation is necessarily Walrasian implies that the principal cannot perfectly reveal her type by her proposal.
We know from Proposition 5 that the Walrasian equilibria of the fictitious economy are generically finite in number. In view of Proposition 8, we can conclude the same for the perfect Bayesian equilibria of our three-stage game. For our purposes, the most important feature of these functions is that the shadow values of the two constraints in the full-information program are independent of the principal's type.24 That is, the marginal rate of substitution between the two slack variables is the same for any type; and so there are no gains to be reaped from trade. The Walrasian equilibrium of the fictitious competitive economy is autarky. Hence, Proposition 1 does not pertain to quasi-linear utilities. Indeed, from previous analysis, we immediately obtain the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 11: In the quasi-linear case, the unique equilibrium payoff vector of the three-stage game is the full-information vector v.
Proposition 11 asserts that, with quasi-linear utilities, the principal neither gains nor loses if her type is revealed to the agent before the game is played. Of course, this is an outcome of the nongeneric nature of the quasi-linear case.
SUMMARY
When values are private, the principal strictly gains, in general, by concealing her type until the contract she proposes is carried out. This concealment enables her to be constrained by the agent's individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints merely in expectation, rather than type by type. One can, in fact, view the different types of principal as competitive traders in the slack variables associated with these constraints; one trader's violation of a constraint is counterbalanced by another trader's accepting some slack. In fact, the equilibria of the three-stage principal-agent game correspond exactly to the Walrasian allocations of this competitive economy (and so, in particular, they are efficient in a strong sense).
The Walrasian interpretation is illuminating in several respects. As we have just indicated, it helps us understand why the principal gains from pooling and how she profits from the agent's ignorance of her type. It also explains why, in equilibrium, the principal's own incentive compatibility constraints are not binding. Just as consumers trading from equal endowments do not envy each other's allocations in Walrasian equilibrium, so no type of principal prefers the equilibrium allocation of some other type.
The analogy with Walrasian equilibrium, however, relies on the privateness of values and the absence of moral hazard. We have already noted that, in common value models, inefficient (and hence non-Walrasian) equilibria may exist in large numbers (see Maskin-Tirole (1988) for greater elaboration). In such models, unlike that of this paper, it is no longer true that, without loss, the principal can postpone revealing her type until the third stage. She may wish to disclose information about herself in order to influence the agent's action. Her proposal must therefore strike some balance between total disclosure and complete concealment.
Although our model is already quite general, many of our assumptions can be relaxed further. The two crucial assumptions for our results are that (i) the principal's information parameter does not enter the agent's utility function (thereby avoiding signaling phenomena) and (ii) the full-information program includes at least two binding agent constraints (so that the principal's types are able to trade slack variables). Thus our results would not be affected by If I'T= 1, then choose E and pri(Ir) to satisfy the same conditions except (a) drop the left-hand inequality in (c6) for i =j and (b) for j = 2, impose U1(, i(A(2)) = U1(j22(1r)) (instead of (c8)) and U1(gi'j(4)) > U1(A2'2(4)) (see the derivation of (c25) below for why we can impose this last inequality).
Condition (c6) ensures that ,U (1Q) Pareto-dominates t'Li(12) by at least E (in utility terms). Conditions (c7) and (c8) require that the type 2 agent strictly prefers his perturbed Walrasian allocation to his reservation utility and that each type strictly prefers his own perturbed allocation to that of the other type. That a perturbation of ,u (I*) can be found satisfying (c7) and (c8) is an immediate consequence of the sorting condition. That such a perturbation can also satisfy (cl) through (c6) (except (c3)) follows from continuity.
We must make sure that the mechanism we construct satisfies condition ( defined by (c9) ). Moreover, if j]e {1, 2}, the third party is given a (small) monetary payoff (such a payoff is feasible since #./ (s') does not quite attain the Walrasian allocation for i') and nothing if j E {3,4,5}.
We shall argue that, if the principal proposes m*, the agent will accept it. There exists an equilibrium of m* in which the third party announces ST equal to the agent's true beliefs s7 and in which the principal and agent both announce their types truthfully. Moreover, in any equilibrium of m* the principal and agent are truthful. Therefore, the only possible allocations resulting from proposing m* are the i:(si). But (cl) implies that, for any s', there exists at least one type i of principal who prefers #'.(7'r) to v'. Thus non-SUPO equilibrium allocations are impossible.
We first demonstrate that ' = ' and truthtelling by the principal and agent constitute an equilibrium. Notice that, if ST = ST and the principal is truthful, (c7), (c8), (cll), (c12), (c15), (c16), (c19), and (c20) imply that the agent is truthful. Moreover, (c2) guarantees that the principal is truthful if the agent is. Now, if the third party announces S'T = ST and the principal and agent are truthful, the third party's payoff is maximal, since the probability that the agent announces 01 or 02 is one. Hence, there is no other announcement he could make that could possibly raise his payoff.
We next show that, if 'T = 4, the only possible equilibrium is the truthful one. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is an untruthful equilibrium. In this equilibrium, let w*', i = 1, 2, be the probability that & = a'. Now, if (7T 1, *2) = (qT 2), then the argument from the preceding paragraph implies that the agent is truthful, which in turn implies that the principal is truthful, a contradiction. Hence ( 4, T*) (71 2 ) CASE I: iT*2, > and X1 < 7.
